±âÃÊ Áö¹æÀÚÄ¡´Üü »çȸº¹Áö ÀÚü»ç¾÷ ÁöÃâ °áÁ¤¿äÀο¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¬±¸
A study on the determinants of welfare spending on primary local government`s own program

»çȸº¸À忬±¸ 2014³â 30±Ç 2È£ p.1 ~ p.34

°íÇýÁø(Ko Hye-Jin) - ¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ »çȸº¹Áö¿¬±¸¼Ò
·ù¿¬±Ô(Ryu Yun-Kyu) - ¼­¿ï½ÅÇдëÇб³ »çȸº¹ÁöÇаú
¾È»óÈÆ(Ahn Sang-Hoon) - ¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ »çȸº¹ÁöÇаú

Abstract

º» ¿¬±¸´Â »çȸº¹ÁöºÐ¾ßÀÇ Áö¹æÀ̾ç ÀÌÈÄ ÁÖ¿ä º¹ÁöÁ¦°øÀÚ·Î ºÎ»óÇÑ ±âÃÊÁö¹æÀÚÄ¡´Ü üÀÇ ÀÚü»ç¾÷ º¹ÁöÁöÃâÀÌ ¾î¶°ÇÑ Á¤Ä¡¡¤°æÁ¦¡¤Á¦µµÀû ¿äÀο¡ ÀÇÇØ °áÁ¤µÇ´ÂÁö¸¦ ÀÌ·ÐÀû¡¤½ÇÁõÀûÀ¸·Î °íÂûÇÑ ¿¬±¸ÀÌ´Ù. ±âÁ¸¿¬±¸¿Í´Â ´Þ¸® ºÐ¼®´ë»óÀ» ÀÚü»ç¾÷À» ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀçÁ¤´É·ÂÀ» º¸À¯ÇÑ ±âÃÊÁöÀÚü·Î ÇÑÁ¤ÇÏ¿´°í, 2005³â ÀçÁ¤ºÐ±ÇÈ­·Î »çȸº¹ÁöÁ¤Ã¥¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Áö¹æÀÚÄ¡´ÜüÀÇ ÀÚÀ²¼ºÀÌ ¹ßÈÖµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÀÌÀüº¸´Ù °ø°íÈ­µÈ ½Ã±â¸¦ Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ¿´À¸ ¸ç, ÇØ´ç ±âÃÊÀÚÄ¡´ÜüÀÇ »çȸº¹ÁöºÐ¾ß ÀÚü»ç¾÷¿¹»ê ºñÁßÀ» Á¾¼Óº¯¼ö·Î ÇÏ¿´´Ù´Â Á¡¿¡ ¼­ ÀÌÀüÀÇ ¼±Ç࿬±¸µé°ú Â÷º°¼ºÀ» º¸ÀδÙ. ºÐ¼®°á°ú ¿ì¸®³ª¶ó ±âÃÊÀÚÄ¡´ÜüÀÇ ÀÚüÀû »ç ȸº¹Áö³ë·ÂÀº ÁÖ·Î °æÁ¦Àû ¿äÀÎ, ƯÈ÷ Áö¹æÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ÀçÁ¤·Â¿¡ »ó´çÈ÷ ÀÇÁ¸ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î µå ·¯³µ´Ù. Á¤Ä¡¡¤Á¦µµÀû ¿äÀÎÀº ¹°·Ð Áö¿ªÀÇ º¹Áö¼ö¿ä¿äÀÎÀÌ ±âÃÊÁöÀÚüÀÇ »çȸº¹ÁöÀÚü»ç ¾÷ ºñÁß¿¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡Áö ¸øÇØ, ÀçÁ¤ºÐ±ÇÈ­ ½ÃÇà ÀÌÈÄ¿¡µµ ÁöÀÚü ´ÜÀ§¿¡¼­ »çȸº¹ÁöÁö ÃâÀÇ ÀÚÀ²¼ºÀÌ ¹ßÈÖµÈ´Ù°í º¸±â´Â ¾î·Á¿ü´Ù. ±âÃÊÀÚÄ¡´Üü´Â Áö¿ª ÁÖ¹ÎÀÇ º¹Áö ¼ö¿ä¸¦ Á÷Á¢ÀûÀ¸·Î ÆÄ¾ÇÇϰí ÀÌ¿¡ ¹ÎøÇÏ°Ô ´ëÀÀÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÇàÁ¤±â°üÀ̱⠶§¹®¿¡ ±¹°íº¸Á¶±Ý »ç ¾÷À» ÅëÇØ ÃæÁ·µÇÁö ¾Ê´Â Áö¿ª ÁÖ¹ÎÀÇ º¹Áö ¼ö¿ä¸¦ ¹Ý¿µÇÏ´Â ÀÚü»ç¾÷ ¿¹»êÀ» È®º¸ÇÒ ÇÊ ¿ä°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. Áö¹æÀÚÄ¡Á¦ÀÇ ¹ß´Þ, º¹Áö ºÐ±ÇÈ­¿¡ µû¶ó ±âÃÊÀÚÄ¡´Üü°¡ Áֹο¡°Ô ½ÇÁúÀûÀÎ º¹Áö °ø±Þ ÁÖü·Î¼­ÀÇ Áö¹æÁ¤ºÎ ¿ªÇÒÀ» °ø°íÈ÷ Çϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â Áö¿ªÀÇ º¹Áö ¼ö¿ä¸¦ º¸´Ù ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀ¸·Î ÆÄ¾ÇÇϰí, º¹Áö ¼ö¿ä¿¡ ¹Î°¨Çϰí È¿À²ÀûÀ¸·Î ´ëÀÀÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀçÁ¤ È®º¸ °èȹ ÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÈ´Ù.
This study aims to examine empirically the political and institutional mechanism of welfare spending on primary local governments as welfare providers based on theoretical backgrounds. This study is differentiated in a number of ways from previous studies. First of all, the subjects of analysis are limited to the primary local governments whose fiscal self-reliance is enough to manage their own program. And besides, the time period of analysis includes the year 2005 when the welfare decentralization is consolidated by fiscal decentralization and lastly the range of welfare spending is specified by local governments` own programs. It was empirically analyzed that the determinants of welfare spending on primary local governments` own programs are mainly fiscal factors and that institutional and political factors hardly affect the welfare spending of local governments. Those results identifies that primary local governments don`t exert autonomy in welfare spending even after welfare decentralization, although primary local governments as main welfare providers are appropriate administrative agency to respond to citizen`s needs. The local governments should be prepared to secure fiscal resources to maintain their own social service programs and provide the services to satisfy the citizen`s needs.

Ű¿öµå

º¹ÁöÀçÁ¤, ºÐ±ÇÈ­, ±âÃÊÀÚÄ¡´Üü, ÀÚü»ç¾÷
Welfare spending, decentralization, primary local government, own program
¿ø¹® ¹× ¸µÅ©¾Æ¿ô Á¤º¸
µîÀçÀú³Î Á¤º¸
ÇмúÁøÈïÀç´Ü(KCI) 
ÁÖÁ¦ÄÚµå
ÁÖÁ¦¸í(Target field)
¿¬±¸´ë»ó(Population)
¿¬±¸Âü¿©(Sample size)
´ë»ó¼ºº°(Gender)
Áúº´Æ¯¼º(Condition Category)
¿¬±¸È¯°æ(Setting)
¿¬±¸¼³°è(Study Design)
¿¬±¸±â°£(Period)
ÁßÀç¹æ¹ý(Intervention Type)
ÁßÀç¸íĪ(Intervention Name)
Ű¿öµå(Keyword)
À¯È¿¼º°á°ú(Recomendation)
¿¬±¸ºñÁö¿ø(Fund Source)
±Ù°Å¼öÁØÆò°¡(Evidence Hierarchy)
ÃâÆÇ³âµµ(Year)
Âü¿©ÀúÀÚ¼ö(Authors)
´ëÇ¥ÀúÀÚ
DOI
KCDÄÚµå
ICD 03
°Ç°­º¸ÇèÄÚµå